Since the order generated by the Lorenz criterion is partial, it is a natural question to wonder how to extend this order. Most of the literature that is concerned with that question focuses on local changes in the income distribution. We follow a different approach, and define uniform α−spreads, which are global changes in the income distribution. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for an Expected Utility or Rank-Dependent Expected Utility maximizer to respect the principle of transfers and to be favorable to uniform α−spreads. Finally, we apply these results to inequality indices.
Introduction
The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers plays a central role in the normative measurement of inequality. This criterion simply says that a (rank preserving) income transfer from a richer to a poorer person reduces inequality. This principle is equivalent to the Lorenz criterion, applied to distributions with the same total income and population size: If the Lorenz curve associated to an income distribution Y is nowhere below the one associated to the distribution X, and X has the same total income and population size than Y , then Y can be obtained from X by a finite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers, and therefore
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we define the notion of uniform α−spreads, and discuss some of its properties. In section 3, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model or with the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model to respect the principle of transfer and to be favorable to uniform α−spreads. Finally, a last section is devoted to the application of the preceding results to the problem of inequality measurement.
Uniform Spreads
Let D be an arbitrary interval of R, and D
• be the interior of D. We denote by D n the set of rank-ordered discrete income distributions of size n ∈ N * (where N * = N \ {0}) with values in D. An income distribution X ∈ D n is defined by:
X = x 1 , 1 n ; x 2 , 1 n ; ... ; x n , 1 n , with x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ ... ≤ x n . Therefore, X denotes the income distribution where a fraction 1 n of the total population has an income equal to x i , for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Note that for any income distribution Y = (y 1 , p 1 ; y 2 , p 2 ; ...; y k , p k ), where the p i are rational numbers and . For simplicity, we let X = (x 1 , ..., x n ). Furthermore, we will denote D = ∪ n∈N * D n .
We denote by F X the probability distribution function associated to X, and by F −1 X the inverse distribution function defined by F −1
1 n x i denotes the mean of X ∈ D n . Let be the decision maker's preference relation over D. We say that a decision maker behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model (see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) ) if there exists a continuous and strictly increasing utility function u : D → R, bounded 1 on D, such that is represented by:
exists a strictly increasing continuous frequency transformation function f :
with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1, such that is represented by:
Finally, a decision maker behaves in accordance with Quiggin's Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model (see Quiggin (1982) 
We will denote for any i ∈ {1, ..., n}:
. In the sequel, we interpret U and V and V (u (.)) as social welfare functions. Obviously, U corresponds to an utilitarian social welfare function, whereas V corresponds to what we call a linear rank-dependent social welfare function, and V (u (.)) corresponds to a rank-dependent social welfare function. Now, let us recall the well-known notion of Lorenz order.
We say that a decision maker respects the Lorenz order iff for all X, Y in D,
The Lorenz order (which is a partial order) plays a central role in the field of inequality measurement. Indeed, it had been proved (see Hardy, Littlewood and Pólya (1934) ) that ifX =Ȳ , and X and Y have the same population size, then Y L X if and only if Y can be derived from X through a finite sequence of rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer individuals (Pigou-Dalton transfers). Although the Lorenz criterion is normatively very appealing, it suffers from a serious drawback, since the weak order generated by this criterion is obviously partial. It is therefore a natural question to wonder how to extend the set of distributions that can be ordered. Most of the literature that is concerned with that question focuses on the principle of composite transfers, i.e., on the combination of a progressive transfer and a regressive transfer.
More precisely, two kinds of composite transfers are considered: The composite transfers that preserve the variance and the mean of the initial distribution, and the ones that preserve the mean and the value of the Gini index of the initial distribution. The first one is associated with third-degree stochastic dominance (see, e.g., Shorrocks and Foster (1987) , Foster and Shorrocks (1988) , Davies and Hoy (1994) ), whereas the second one is associated with inverse third-degree stochastic dominance (see, e.g., Muliere and Scarsini (1989) , Moyes (1990) , Chateauneuf and Wilthien (1998), Zoli (1999) ). In both cases, necessary and sufficient conditions for a social welfare function to respect both the principle of transfers and the principle of composite transfer under consideration have been identified.
Both approaches focus on local spreads, i.e., spreads concerning only four (at most) individuals. Our approach is somewhat different, since we restrict our attention to global changes in the distribution. The main idea is the following. Consider a distribution X with n individuals, and assume that x k < x k+1 . What would be the consequence of taxing the individual occupying the (k + 1) th position in the ladder, without perturbing the ordering, and then redistributing the collected tax uniformly among the remaining agents? We will call such a change in a distribution an uniform α−spread, with α = k n .
More formally, we have the following definition.
such that:
Obviously, if Y u α X, these two distributions cannot be ordered by the Lorenz criterion. Furthermore, a simple inspection of Definition 2 shows that the Lorenz curves associated with Y and X cross only once, and that the curve associated with Y is above the one associated with X for ξ ≤ Proposition 1. If a decision maker respects the principle of transfer and is favorable to uniform α−spreads, then he is favorable to uniform α −spreads, for all α ≥ α.
Proposition 1 leads us to a natural definition of a decision maker's sensitivity to uniform spreads.
Definition 4. The degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads of a decision maker who respects the Lorenz order is defined by:
Because it is not assumed that the size of the population is fixed, and because it can be arbitrarily large, the degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads can take any value in the interval [0, 1]. Assume, for instance, that the decision maker is favorable to uniform 1 n −spreads. Then, when n tends to ∞, the infimum of α such that the decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads is equal to lim n→∞ 1 n = 0, and therefore the decision maker's degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads is equal to 1. Observe that, in this case, the decision maker is favorable to any uniform spread. On the other hand, a decision maker who respects the principle of transfers, must at least be favorable to uniform n−1 n −spreads, since these spreads are actually a sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers.
However, assume that the decision maker is favorable only to uniform n−1 n −spreads and to Pigou-Dalton transfers. Then, his degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads is equal to
Observe that a uniform of k when the size of the population is large, and the decision maker respects the Lorenz order: It means that the decision maker is ready to accept an increase of inequality among the very rich persons, provided that it is accompanied by a decrease of inequality among the rest of the population. Roughly speaking, the decision maker's degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads measures the size of the population among which the reduction of inequality is not seen as a priority by the decision maker. The extreme case is that of a Rawlsian decision maker, who is mainly concerned by the poorest individual: His degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads is then equal to 1. This does not mean, however, that such a decision maker is not favorable to Pigou-Dalton transfers among richer individuals.
But a policy that increases the poorest individual's income is then seen as favorable, even if the cost of such a policy is an increase of inequality among the rest of the population.
A natural interpretation is that, if the decision maker is favorable to uniform k n -spreads, he considers the k poorest individuals as "poor" individuals. However, it does not imply, unlike to the "focusing axiom" used in poverty measurement, that the decision maker is not concerned with richer individuals. Hence, the principle of uniform α−spreads lies somewhere between the principle of transfers and the focusing principle.
Uniform Spreads and Social Welfare Functions
We give here necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision maker who respects the Lorenz order to be favorable to uniform α−spreads. We successively focus on decision makers who behave in accordance with the Expected Utility model, with the Rank-Dependent
Expected Utility model, and with Yaari's dual model, which is a particular case of the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model.
Uniform Spreads and the Expected Utility model
Our first result is, at first sight, striking: A decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model is favorable to uniform α−spreads if, and only if, his Social
Welfare Function reduces to the mathematical expectation of the income distribution, whatever the value of α is. (i) The decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads.
(ii) u (x) = x, ∀x ∈ D (up to an increasing affine transformation).
Proof. Fix k and n > 2 such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and α = k n . The decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads if for any X = (x 1 , ..., x n ) in D such that x k < x k+1 and ε such that 0 < ε ≤
which is equivalent to:
Let y and x, in D • with y < x be arbitrarily chosen, and let x 1 = x 2 = ... = x k = y,
Divide this expression by (n − 1)ε:
Now let ε tend to 0. One obtains:
and therefore, u (y) ≥ u (x) for all y and
Let x, y and β be arbitrarily chosen such that x < y, β > 0, and x − β and y belong
.. = x n = y, and x k+1 = x. If the decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads, then, for ε ∈ (0,
Now let ε tend to 0. We obtain:
Now let β tend to 0. We get: u (y) ≥ u (x) for any x and y in D • such that x < y. Hence
Since u (x) ≥ 0 and u (x) ≤ 0 for any x in D • , and since u is continuous on D,
u (x) = x, up to an increasing affine transformation, for all x in D. We have hence proved that (i) implies (ii).
That (ii) implies (i) is trivial, and the proof is completed.
Note that Theorem 1 doesn't depend on any assumption about the decision maker's attitude toward Pigou-Dalton transfers.
Actually, this result doesn't really come as a surprise. Indeed, a uniform spread is a Consider then, for an arbitrarily chosen 1 ≤ k < n the distribution in which (i) x k is arbitrarily close to a with x k > a, (ii) x i ∈ (a, x) for all i < k, so that the impact of each progressive transfer is as close to 0 as one would like, and (iii) it then follows that the net impact of these transfers can be negative, and therefore the decision maker cannot be favorable to uniform k n −spreads. A similar argument applies in the strictly convex case. Therefore, it must be the case that u is linear.
Uniform Spreads and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model
Now, let us consider a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model. First, we recall the following result (see Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) ).
Theorem 2. For a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Rank-Dependent
Expected Utility model, with a frequency transformation f differentiable on [0, 1], the following two propositions are equivalent:
(i) The decision maker respects the Lorenz order.
(ii) u is concave and f is convex.
We also need to define the index of thriftiness of a utility function, introduced by Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson (1997) . This index is defined by:
The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model to respect the Lorenz order and to be favorable to uniform α−spreads. (i) The decision maker respects the Lorenz order and is favorable to uniform α−spreads.
(ii) f is convex, u is concave on D and
We know from Theorem 2 that a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model respects the Lorenz order if and only if u is concave and f is convex.
Let α = l r ∈ ]0, 1[ ∩ Q be fixed. Let n = rm and k = lm, where m ∈ N * is arbitrarily chosen. Assume that the decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads, and let
Let x, y and β be arbitrarily chosen such that x < y, β > 0, x, y ∈ D
• and x − β ∈ D.
Let x k+1 = x, x 1 = x 2 = ... = x k = x − β and x k+2 = ... = x n = y. Then (2) implies for
Therefore:
Since the right hand side of this inequality decreases when
increases, this inequality is satisfied for all x < y if and only if:
By Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that the decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads. Since u is concave it is enough to prove that for any x and y in D such that
x < y, and any ε > 0 such that ε ≤ y−x n and y + ε ∈ D,
for all (k, n) for which α = k n
. Consider any such (k, n).
The concavity of u implies, for any ε ∈ (0,
Hence, it is enough to prove that, for any y > x in D and any ε ∈ (0,
which may be written as follows:
Dividing both terms by u (y + ε) leads to:
Since f is convex, we have:
It is hence enough to prove:
Since u is concave,
> 1 for all 0 < x < y and ε > 0. Since f is increasing, the preceding inequality is satisfied whenever:
increases, this last inequality is satisfied whenever:
which is the desired result.
Note that Theorem 3 implies the following result.
decision maker who behaves in accordance with
Yaari's dual model with a frequency transformation function f differentiable on [0, 1], the following two propositions are equivalent:
(i) The decision maker is favorable to uniform α−spreads and respects the Lorenz order.
(ii) f is convex and f (1 − α) ≤ 1. Proof. By Theorem 3, if a decision maker who behaves in accordance with the RankDependent Expected Utility model respects the Lorenz order and is favorable to uniform α−spreads, then:
Theorem 3 also implies that u is concave. Thus, T u ≥ 1. Hence, the preceding inequality
Let us now apply our different results to the problem of inequality measurement.
Inequality Indices and Uniform Spreads
Following Kolm (1969) , Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) , one can derive an inequality measure from a social welfare function. Let Ξ (X) be the per capita income which, if distributed equally, is indifferent to X ∈ D according to the social welfare function W . This "equally distributed equivalent income" is implicitly defined by the relation: First, consider the Atkinson index defined by
This index relies on the following Expected Utility social welfare functions:
The following proposition immediately follows from Theorem 1: Let us now consider the large class of Yaari indices. These indices are defined as follows (Yaari (1988) , Ebert (1988) ):
Applying Corollary 1, we obtain the following result: Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990) define the sub-class of Yaari indices which satisfy an aggregation axiom. These indices, known as S-Gini indices, are defined as follows:
with δ > 1. These indices correspond to the following social welfare function:
with f (p) = p δ . Note that for δ = 2, I SG is nothing but the Gini index. The following proposition establishes a link between the degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads (see (1−δ) 2 . Since ψ (δ) = δ−1 δ 2 , we get: ψ (δ) > 0 for all δ > 1. Furthermore, ψ(1) = 0. Therefore, ψ(δ) > 0 for all δ > 1.
Hence, ξ (δ) > 0 for all δ > 1, which entails φ (δ) > 0 for all δ > 1. Hence, the degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads of I SG with parameter δ is φ(δ), and the greater δ is, the higher is the degree of sensitivity to uniform spreads of the index. Finally, we have lim δ→1 φ(δ) = 1 e Finally, the very general inequality index (let us call it a super-generalized Gini index):
considered by Ebert (1988) and Chateauneuf (1996) corresponds to a Rank-Dependent
Expected Utility-like social welfare function, with a utility function u and a frequency transformation function f . Applying Theorem 3 we obtain the following result. 
